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INTRODUCTION 
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (“PSLRA”)1 in “response to perceived abuses in securities fraud 
litigation.”2  The purpose of the PSLRA was to “prevent an onslaught of 
 
* Sharon Nelles is a partner in Sullivan & Cromwell LLP’s Litigation Group.  Sharon 
represents financial institutions and global companies in high-profile civil litigations and related 
regulatory, congressional, and criminal investigations, and enforcement actions.  She is currently 
active in many matters arising from the subprime mortgage crisis and frequently conducts 
investigations for corporate clients, special committees, and boards of directors. 
** Hilary Huber started at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP in 2012 after a one-year clerkship.  
Since joining the firm, she has been a part of teams representing financial institutions and global 
companies in commercial litigation matters, particularly related to the issuance and trading of 
securities and alleged fraudulent practices in connection with lending activities, as well as breach 
of contract disputes. 
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
2. Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 230 F.R.D. 250, 258 (D. Mass. 2005) (citing In re 
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expensive and frivolous lawsuits when stock prices plummet, which 
could force corporations to settle meritless claims to avoid the expense 
of discovery and trial.”3  Since the PSLRA’s enactment, the plaintiffs’ 
bar has become increasingly critical of certain of its provisions—
particularly its heightened pleading standard.4  Although some criticism 
may be justified, much of it ignores that the PSLRA was intended to 
place the burden on plaintiffs to ensure they have a valid basis for 
bringing a securities fraud suit.  With diligent pre-filing investigations, 
plaintiffs should be able to gather facts that adequately state a claim for 
securities fraud, where such fraud truly exists. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  First, it briefly describes the 
PSLRA and how the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Inc.5 addressed some of the PSLRA’s purported 
ambiguities.  The second Part briefly addresses some commentators’ 
contentions that the PSLRA and Tellabs created insurmountable hurdles 
for plaintiffs at the motion to dismiss stage.  Third, it walks through 
some examples of “the good, the bad, and the ugly” of securities fraud 
pleadings, with a focus on the “scienter” and “misstatements or 
omissions” elements of a securities fraud claim.  This third Part focuses 
on the—often problematic—use of confidential witnesses to meet the 
PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards. 
I. THE PSLRA 
A. The Purpose of the PSLRA 
The PSLRA “was intended to address concerns that had been raised 
about abuses believed to be associated with securities class action 
lawsuits.”6  As its plain language indicates, the PSLRA was not enacted 
 
Galileo Corp. S’holders Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 251, 260 (D. Mass. 2001)). 
3. In re Accelr8 Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053–54 (D. Colo. 2001). 
4. See, e.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture, Around the World of Securities Fraud in Eighty 
Motions to Dismiss, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 553, 559 (2014) (showing that 53% of analyzed cases 
were dismissed bases on insufficient scienter allegations); Charles Murdock, The Private 
Litigation Securities Reform Act and Particularity: Why Are Some Courts in an Alternate 
Universe?, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 616, 630 (2014) (arguing that the PSLRA’s heightened 
particularity requirement has resulted in illogical or inconsistent applications of the Act by 
courts); Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and 
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 727 (2014) (arguing that “for securities 
litigation to achieve its deterrent and compensatory purposes” securities pleading standards must 
revert to their pre-PLSRA status). 
5. 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
6. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 5–6 [hereinafter SEC REPORT], available at 
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preemptively; it was enacted to address a very real issue.  Prior to the 
PSLRA, the availability of “wide-ranging discovery gave plaintiffs’ 
lawyers incentives to ‘file [frivolous] lawsuits in order to conduct 
discovery in the hopes of finding a sustainable claim not alleged in the 
complaint.’”7  In the normal course of civil litigation, once a complaint 
was filed, “plaintiffs’ lawyers were free to impose massive costs on 
defendants in the form of discovery requests.”8 
At that time, many defendants “believed that they were victims of 
meritless lawsuits which alleged ‘fraud by hindsight.’”9  In such suits, 
the plaintiff would file a lawsuit immediately following a drop in a 
company’s stock price, claiming that the drop served as “evidence that 
the issuer and its agents had been misrepresenting the company’s 
operations or performance in order to inflate its stock price.”10  More 
often than not defendants were right: plaintiffs filed frivolous or 
meritless lawsuits against “‘deep pocket’ defendants—whether or not 
these defendants actually committed fraud—solely for their settlement 
value.”11  A defendant, faced with the potentially enormous costs of 
responding to discovery requests, would often cave to the pressure to 
settle.12  This meant that innocent parties would settle frivolous 
securities class actions to avoid a “potentially ruinous jury verdict.”13  
These settlement costs, not insubstantial themselves, were generally 
born by current shareholders.   
The PSLRA was intended to curb these frivolous suits and decrease 
the number of “vexatious, even extortionate class action filings” that 
marked the pre-PSLRA securities litigation landscape.14  The statute has 
three mechanisms to achieve this end: (1) a heightened pleading 
standard, (2) a discovery stay during the pendency of any motion to 
dismiss, and (3) a mandate that courts conduct an inquiry under Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 
 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt. 
7. Id. at 6–7. 
8. Id. at 6. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 7. 
14. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F.Supp.2d 633, 634–
35 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)–(c) (2012). 
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B. The PSLRA’s Heightened Pleading Standard 
As noted above, the way that the PSLRA attempts to discourage 
frivolous litigation is through a heightened pleading standard.  The 
PSLRA effectively replaced Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as the applicable pleading standard in private securities 
suits.16  It requires a plaintiff alleging securities fraud based on 
misleading statements or omissions of material facts to “specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why 
the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement 
or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state 
with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”17  Misleading 
statements or omissions must have been misleading at the time the 
statements were made; this prevents plaintiffs from asserting liability 
based on events subsequent to the alleged fraud.18 
The PSLRA further requires that plaintiffs “state with particularity 
[the] facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with 
the required state of mind.”19  This requirement is a “sharp break” from 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).20  Under the PSLRA, “‘a plaintiff 
can no longer plead the requisite scienter element generally.’”21 
Congress did not define the phrase “strong inference” or set forth a 
rubric for courts to use to determine whether a plaintiff pled facts 
sufficient to allege a “strong inference” of scienter.  Although it is 
axiomatic that an “inference” is a logical conclusion deduced by 
considering relevant facts,22 ambiguity remained as to what facts courts 
should consider as they try to determine whether a plaintiff sufficiently 
alleged scienter and what makes an inference “strong.”  This ambiguity 
resulted in a circuit split, with courts across the country applying 
different standards to determine whether a plaintiff alleged a “strong 
 
16. See Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 242 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013) (comparing Rule 
9(b) with the pleading standards under the PLSRA). 
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B). 
18. Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., No. 11–1624(JLL), 2012 WL 762311, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 
2012) (noting that “‘liability cannot be imposed on the basis of subsequent events’” (quoting In re 
NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1330 (3d Cir. 2002))). 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
20. Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 2009). 
21. Id. (quoting Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2008)).  
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) (“[Plaintiffs must] state with particularity facts giving rise to a 
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”), with  FED. R. CIV. P. 
9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 
generally.”). 
22. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009) (defining inference as “a conclusion 
reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them”). 
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inference” of scienter.23  For example, in the Seventh Circuit, a 
complaint would survive if “a reasonable person could infer that the 
defendant acted with the required intent.”24  The court did not require a 
comparison of the relative strength of competing inferences (i.e., the 
court would not compare a defendant’s innocent explanation for a drop 
in a stock price with the plaintiff’s alleged fraud).25  In the Sixth Circuit, 
however, “the strong inference requirement create[d] a situation in 
which ‘plaintiffs [were] entitled only to the most plausible of competing 
inferences.’”26  In other words, a court would have to decide whether 
the plaintiff’s allegation of fraud was the most plausible explanation for 
a stock price decline. 
In light of the circuit split, approximately twelve years after the 
PSLRA’s enactment, the Supreme Court decided Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Inc., in which it provided some guidance on the 
troublesome and unsettled “strong inference” requirement in the 
PSLRA.27  The Court decided that on a motion to dismiss, the trial court 
judge must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and 
then compare all of the culpable and nonculpable explanations that 
could be drawn from them.28  An inference is “strong” only when the 
culpable explanation is at least as likely as the non-culpable 
explanation.29  The inference “must be cogent and compelling, thus 
strong in light of other explanations.”30 
Although it seemed like the Supreme Court’s Tellabs decision should 
have resolved the pre-PSLRA circuit split over the “strong inference” 
requirement, there remained a post-Tellabs divergence between the 
lower courts.31  In accordance with Tellabs, it would seem that judges 
should have begun their analysis of a securities fraud claim by making a 
 
23. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319–20 (2007) 
(contrasting the Second Circuit’s and Seventh Circuit’s approach to evaluating plaintiffs’ 
allegations of scienter upon a motion to dismiss). 
24. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 551 
U.S. 308. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. (quoting Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
27. Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308. 
28. Id. at 310. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy 
Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 637, 640 (2010) (positing that the Court “injected considerable uncertainty into the 
pleading game” when it handed down its opinion in Tellabs); John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs 
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 682–84 (2008) 
(contrasting circuit’s and district courts’ approaches to “strong inference” post-Tellabs). 
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“holistic” inquiry considering whether all of the facts alleged in the 
complaint raise a “strong inference” of scienter.32  However, courts in 
different circuits have applied Tellabs differently. 
For example, post-Tellabs, the Second Circuit continues to hold that a 
plaintiff may establish a “strong inference” of scienter “by 
particularized allegations showing (1) that defendants had the ‘motive 
and opportunity’ to commit fraud, or (2) there was strong circumstantial 
evidence of ‘conscious misbehavior or recklessness.’”33  In doing so, 
the Second Circuit has effectively reaffirmed its pre-Tellabs, arguably 
plaintiff-friendly, jurisprudence.34 
The Ninth Circuit continues to apply its pre-Tellabs case law as 
well—but courts in this circuit applied a different test than those in the 
Second Circuit before Tellabs and thus continued to do so after 
Tellabs.35  The Ninth Circuit articulated a two-part test to determine 
whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged scienter: (1) the court must 
determine whether any of the allegations, standing alone, are sufficient 
to create a strong inference of scienter and (2) if no allegation is alone 
sufficient, then the court must conduct a “holistic” review of all of the 
allegations “to determine whether the insufficient allegations combine 
to create a strong inference of intentional conduct or deliberate 
recklessness.”36 
This post-Tellabs circuit split with respect to pleading “scienter” 
makes it difficult to pin down precisely what standard of particularity is 
required for the allegations to be considered a “strong inference.”  Thus, 
litigants in different circuits need to be cognizant of the standards in 
their circuit and remain aware as the “strong inference” standard 
continues to evolve. 
 
32. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326 (“[T]he court’s job is not to scrutinize each allegation in 
isolation but to assess all the allegations holistically.  In sum, the reviewing court must ask: When 
the allegations are accepted as true and taken collectively, would a reasonable person deem the 
inference of scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference?” (citations omitted)). 
33. Arunesh Sohi, Circuits in Disarray Before and After Tellabs v. Makor: A Call For the 
Supreme Court to Weigh in on Securities Fraud Pleading Requirements Again, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 
215 (2010). 
34. Id. 
35. See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e 
hold that the Court’s decision in Tellabs does not materially alter the particularity requirements 
for scienter claims established in our previous decisions, but instead only adds an additional 
‘holistic’ component to those requirements . . . .”). 
36. N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young, 641 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Zucco Partners, LLC, 552 F.3d at 991–92.). 
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C. Additional Changes Under the PSLRA 
As stated above, the PSLRA includes two additional requirements 
that differentiate securities fraud suits from “standard” civil litigation.  
First, the PSLRA provides that “all discovery and other proceedings 
shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the 
court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is 
necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that 
party.”37  Second, the PSLRA requires courts to conduct a Rule 11 
inquiry upon final adjudication of the suit.38  If the court determines that 
compliance with Rule 11 is lacking, then it must impose sanctions on 
the plaintiff for filing a frivolous suit.39   
II. POST-PSLRA MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Securities fraud is a complicated area of law that continues to evolve 
as courts in different circuits decide post-PSLRA, post-Tellabs motions 
to dismiss securities fraud claims.  Nevertheless, virtually every time a 
plaintiff files a complaint alleging securities fraud, the defendant moves 
to dismiss that complaint.40  Some commentators have argued that the 
PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements, discovery stay, and 
mandatory Rule-11 inquiry have transformed the motion to dismiss into 
a significant access barrier for plaintiffs.41  Some courts have even 
called the 10b-5 motion to dismiss an “acid test,”42 an “eye of a needle 
made smaller and smaller over the years by judicial decree and 
congressional action,”43 and a return to “a ‘demurrer-like’ process that 
 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c). 
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
40. See RENZO COMOLLI, SUKAINA KLEIN, RONALD I. MILLER & SVETLANA STARYKH, 
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2012 
FULL-YEAR REVIEW 16 (2013) [hereinafter NERA, RECENT TRENDS], available at 
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Year_End_Trends_01.2013.pdf (“A motion to dismiss was 
filed in more than 96% of all cases.  Of the 4% of cases without a motion to dismiss, virtually all 
ended with settlements.”). 
41. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Toward a Just Measure of Repose: The 
Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1547, 1582–83 (2010) 
(asserting that heightened pleading standards increase the likelihood a claim will be dismissed); 
John M. Wunderlich, The Importance of the Prefiling Phase for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 45 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 737, 740 (2014) (arguing that heightened pleading standards and increased 
focus on the prefiling phase of securities litigation have created “access barriers” to plaintiffs 
filing securities suits). 
42. Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per 
curiam). 
43. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam). 
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creates considerable hurdles that a plaintiff must overcome before any 
discovery is permitted.’”44 
However, considering that the express purpose of the PSLRA is to 
minimize the number of frivolous securities fraud suits,45 it should 
come as no surprise that it is now more challenging for a plaintiff to 
survive a motion to dismiss than it was before the law’s enactment.46  It 
bears noting that the imposition of additional requirements on plaintiffs 
attempting to plead a viable securities fraud claim has not made 
defending against such claims commensurately easier on defendants 
once a complaint is filed.  After all, in some respects, the PSLRA 
merely requires plaintiffs to do what they should have done anyway—
ensure there is a cognizable basis for a fraud claim, supported by 
articulable facts, before filing their suit.  Moreover, whereas plaintiffs 
often have years to investigate and gather facts to develop their claims 
before filing the complaint, defendants are often forced to respond to 
the complaint within a matter of weeks. 47 
Some commentators have gone so far as to say that the Supreme 
Court’s Tellabs analysis “tilts steeply in favor of plaintiffs who, as 
masters of their own complaints, can buttress their claims with as many 
documents and witnesses as they please.”48  These commentators 
maintain that Tellabs was in fact a pro-plaintiff decision because it held 
that a plaintiff only has to show that their allegations are merely as 
likely as any other nonculpable explanation.49  “In contrast, Tellabs 
limits defendants to making their argument for exculpatory inferences 
based only on the complaint that plaintiffs have written and such public 
documents as have traditionally been relied upon by courts in 
determining a motion to dismiss.”50 
Securities fraud suits implicate billions of dollars and have “bet the 
 
44. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
45. SEC REPORT, supra note 6, at 6. 
46. See NERA, RECENT TRENDS, supra note 40, at 17 (“[Thirty-one percent] of [securities] 
cases continue[] past the motion to dismiss, at least in part.  In an additional 5% of cases, 
dismissal was granted, though without prejudice.”); see also In re Accelr8 Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 
147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053–54 (D. Colo. 2001) (discussing heightened pleading standards under 
the PLSRA). 
47. Compare 28 USC § 1658 (2012) (setting the statute of limitations for a private securities 
claim as two to five years), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (giving defendants twenty-one days to respond 
to a compliant and summons). 
48. Christopher J. Keller and Michael W. Stocker, ‘Tellabs’: PSLRA Pleading Test 
Comparative, Not Absolute, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
id=900005492538#. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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company implications” for defendants.  There should be high hurdles 
and careful scrutiny.  Those who argue that the PSLRA imposes 
unreasonable pleading standards or that its (rarely invoked) Rule 11 
provision51 is too harsh must consider that if there truly is a cognizable 
basis to bring a fraud claim, then a diligent pre-filing investigation 
should lead to evidence that supports that claim.  And with this 
evidence, regardless of the state of the post-Tellabs law in a given 
circuit, there is a great likelihood that the complaint will survive a 
motion to dismiss. 
Successfully pleading a securities fraud claim is not as daunting a 
task as it may seem.  The next Part addresses some of the good, the bad, 
and the ugly of securities fraud pleadings using some well-known 
and/or recent examples from case law. 
III. SECURITIES FRAUD PLEADINGS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, THE UGLY 
A. The Good 
We begin with “the good” and focus on a case with which most 
readers are likely familiar: Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano.52  In 
Matrixx Initiatives, the Supreme Court itself applied the Tellabs 
standard for the first time.  The case presented the question of whether a 
plaintiff (Siracusano) could state a claim for securities fraud based on 
the failure of Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (“Matrixx”) to disclose reports of 
adverse events associated with one of its products (a nasal spray that 
was said to shorten the lifespan of a cold) even though the reports did 
not disclose a “statistically significant number of adverse events.”53 
 The Court found the following alleged facts sufficient to show 
scienter under the PSLRA: 
 1. Matrixx was concerned enough about the information it received 
regarding the adverse effects of its product that it hired a consultant to 
review the product, participated in animal studies, and convened a panel 
of physicians and scientists in response to an academic researcher’s 
presentation about how Matrixx’s product caused users to lose their 
sense of smell; 
 2. Matrixx successfully prevented the academic researcher from 
using its product’s name in his presentation; and 
3. Matrixx issued a press release suggesting that studies had 
 
51. See Couture, supra note 4, at __ (stating that out of thirty-nine opinions analyzed, only 
four opinions made Rule 11 findings and in only one of those four cases did the court impose a 
Rule 11 sanction). 
52. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011). 
53. Id. at 1303. 
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confirmed that its product did not cause users to lose their sense of 
smell when, in fact, Matrixx had not conducted any studies of its own 
and the scientific evidence at that time was insufficient to determine 
whether the product did or did not have that effect.54 
The Court considered these facts “collectively,” as required by its 
Tellabs decision, and determined that they established a “‘cogent and 
compelling’ inference that Matrixx elected not to disclose the reports of 
adverse events . . . because it understood their likely effect on the 
market.”55  Employing the Tellabs standard, the Court held, “‘[A] 
reasonable person’ would deem the inference that Matrixx acted with 
deliberate recklessness (or even intent) ‘at least as compelling as any 
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.’”56 
Matrixx demonstrates that plaintiffs have available and should take 
advantage of a combination of different sources and inferences to show 
scienter at the pleading stage.  The facts corroborating the claims here—
for example, the fact Matrixx had prevented the academic researchers 
from using its product’s name in their presentation—were gathered 
before discovery and without the plaintiffs taking any unethical or 
unreasonable measures.57 
Although some may consider Matrixx unusual because of the 
existence of publically available research about a well-known product in 
that case, there are numerous cases in which plaintiffs were likewise 
able to gather facts sufficient to adequately plead a securities fraud 
claim in less public circumstances.  Consider, for example, Borneo 
Energy Sendirian Berhad v. Sustainable Power Corp.58  Here, plaintiff 
Borneo Energy Sendirian Berhad (“Borneo Energy”), learned that the 
defendant, Sustainable Power Corp. (“Sustainable Power”), had a 
technology that it claimed could produce “‘Vertroleum,’ a biofuel, from 
various materials, including palm waste.”59  Borneo Energy was 
“interested in developing the potential of such waste.”60 
Borneo Energy alleged that Sustainable Power’s representatives 
made a number of representations about its products upon which it 
 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 1324–25 (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323–24 
(2007)). 
56. Id. at 1325 (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324). 
57. See Brief for Respondents at 5–17, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 09-1156) 
(describing the plaintiffs’ evidence supporting their allegations of scienter and materiality). 
58. 646 F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
59. Id. at 863. 
60. Id. 
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relied when it purchased shares of Sustainable Power’s stock.61  A few 
months after the stock purchase, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) sued Sustainable Power for securities fraud 
arising from representations similar to those it made to Borneo 
Energy.62  Shortly thereafter, Borneo Energy brought a private litigation 
alleging securities fraud against Sustainable Power.  Finding that 
Borneo Energy adequately pleaded misrepresentation, the court 
explained: 
The complaint specifies the speaker (Rivera), the statements 
(representations about Vertroleum and test results relating to it, 
Sustainable Power’s business, the existence of contracts to sell 
Vertroleum, the presence of plans to generate electricity from biogas, 
that Sustainable Power was being audited and would shortly be able to 
produce audited financials and other information, and the omitted 
information about the SEC investigation into Rivera).  The complaint 
also specifies the date, place, and circumstances of the statements, and 
the basis for alleging that they were fraudulent when made.63 
On the basis of these allegations, the court found that the complaint 
“alleged with particularity that Rivera knew that the Vertroleum did not 
meet the certain biofuel standards or fertilizer standards, although it was 
represented to meet them.”64  In other words, these alleged facts met the 
heightened standard required to plead the “misrepresentation” element 
of a securities fraud claim.  Borneo Energy, like Matrixx, shows that 
gathering the facts necessary to state a non-frivolous securities fraud 
claim does not require extraordinary measures.  Prospective plaintiffs 
should investigate whether the SEC or other regulatory agencies have 
brought any charges against the potential defendant that would help 
bolster the claims in a securities fraud civil litigation.   
B. The Bad 
Next, we turn to some examples of “the bad”—securities fraud 
pleadings that simply do not rise to the level of particularity necessary 
under the PSLRA.  In In re Boston Scientific Corporation Securities 
Litigation, the First Circuit considered a plaintiff shareholders’ security 
fraud claims against a medical device manufacturer.65  Finding the 
complaint did not adequately plead scienter, the First Circuit explained:  
In cases where we have found the pleading standard satisfied, the 
 
61. Id. at 864. 
62. Id. at 868. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. 686 F.3d 21, 26–27(1st Cir. 2012). 
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complaint often contains clear allegations of admissions, internal 
records or witnessed discussions suggesting that at the time they made 
the statements claimed to be misleading, the defendant officers were 
aware that they were withholding vital information or at least were 
warned by others that this was so.66   
No such direct evidence was pled in the complaint here.  In fact, the 
plaintiffs did not identify any basis for imputing wrongful intent.67  And 
the allegedly omitted information was not of such powerful importance 
that wrongful intent could reasonably be inferred.68  In short, the 
plaintiffs failed to allege any facts that tended to show securities 
fraud—let alone created a strong inference of such fraud. 
The Third Circuit likewise affirmed the dismissal of a securities fraud 
claim in Barnard v. Verizon Communications Inc.,69 in which the 
district court found that the complaint did not meet the heightened 
pleading requirements of the PSLRA.70  The Third Circuit held that 
what was already the plaintiff’s second amended complaint “did not 
provide any facts from which one could ascertain whether the 
defendants made any actionable misrepresentations or omissions at 
all.”71  The “closest” the plaintiff came to alleging a misrepresentation 
or omission was a reference to one of the defendants’ annual statements, 
but the plaintiff “failed to indicate how, if at all, the annual statements 
could be interpreted as material misrepresentations or omissions.”72 
These complaints exemplify precisely the kind of securities fraud 
suits the PSLRA was designed to prevent.  Even after multiple attempts 
to plead their claims, these plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege a 
securities fraud claim.  This failure was not because the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading requirements are onerous or unreasonable, but 
rather because the complaints lacked any facts corroborating the 
plaintiffs’ respective fraud claims.  Indeed, it seemed that no such 
corroborating facts existed.  Thus, while some may argue that the 
PSLRA has made it unreasonably difficult to survive a motion to 
dismiss, the reality is that dismissal of these meritless cases before 
discovery commences serves the PSLRA’s purpose by eliminating weak 
or frivolous claims as early as possible.   
 
66. Id. at 31. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. 451 F. App’x 80 (3d Cir. 2011). 
70. Id. at 85. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
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C. The Ugly 
One unfortunate side effect of the PSLRA appears to be the rise of 
unscrupulous behavior by plaintiffs and/or their counsel during the pre-
filing investigation period and when stating the allegations in the 
complaint.  This behavior exemplifies the “ugly” side of securities fraud 
pleadings.  This Section considers two examples of the “ugly,” both of 
which involve confidential witness statements.73   
First, in City of Pontiac General Employees’ Retirement Systems v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp.,74 the defendants moved to dismiss the 
complaint and the court stayed discovery until it ruled on the 
defendant’s motion, pursuant to the PSLRA.75  Eventually, the court 
denied the motion to dismiss, basing its decision in part on the alleged 
statements of confidential witnesses set forth in the complaint.76 
After issuing its denial of the motion to dismiss, the court lifted the 
discovery stay and the discovery process ensued, during which the 
defendants deposed the individuals who served as the confidential 
witnesses in the complaint.77  Based on those depositions, the 
defendants learned, and later asserted in their motion for summary 
judgment, that several of the confidential witnesses on which the 
complaint relied “‘recanted’ statements attributed to them” and/or 
“denied making such statements in the first place.”78  The plaintiffs 
contended that the recanting confidential witnesses changed their stories 
because of pressure from the defendants.79 
Noting that the parties’ “competing assertions raised serious 
questions, going well beyond the legal issues presented by summary 
judgment,” and in the interest of protecting “the integrity of the 
adversary process itself,”80 the court sua sponte directed the five 
confidential witnesses to appear in court, along with the plaintiffs’ 
 
73. The use of confidential witnesses in securities fraud pleadings has raised a number of 
ethical issues that have been written about in great detail.  See e.g., Kaufman & Wunderlich, 
supra note 31, at 661–62 (discussing the appropriate inquiry for assessing the validity of 
confidential witnesses); Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 551, 551 (2011) (examining two issues presented by relying on confidential witnesses in 
securities pleadings).  This Article does not purport to address even a small number of those 
issues; it merely considers a couple of noteworthy examples from recent case law. 
74. No. 11 Civ. 5026(JSR), 2013 WL 3389473 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013). 
75. Id. at *1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012)). 
76. Id. at *2. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
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private investigator.81  After hearing the witnesses testify in court, the 
judge determined that some of the confidential witnesses “had been 
lured by the investigator into stating as ‘facts’ what were often mere 
surmises, but then, when their indiscretions were revealed, felt 
pressured into denying outright statements.”82 
This determination led the presiding judge, the Honorable Jed 
Rakoff, to directly address “the ugly” of securities fraud pleadings in his 
order on the motion for summary judgment: “While [the PSLRA was] 
designed to give district courts a ‘gatekeeper’ responsibility to derail 
dubious class action lawsuits at the outset, an unintended consequence 
has been to cause plaintiffs’ counsel to undertake surreptitious pre-
pleading investigations designed to obtain ‘dirt’ from dissatisfied 
corporate employees.”83  Judge Rakoff further stated:  
It seems highly unlikely that Congress or the Supreme Court [in its 
Tellabs decision], in demanding a fair amount of evidentiary detail in 
securities class action complaints, intended to turn plaintiffs’ counsel 
into corporate “private eyes” who would entice naive or disgruntled 
employees into gossip sessions that might help support a federal 
lawsuit.84 
In the next example, City of Livonia Employees’ Retirement System v. 
Boeing Co.,85 the plaintiffs also relied on a confidential witness’s 
statements to support their allegations of securities fraud in their 
amended complaint.  The plaintiffs’ counsel “represented to the court 
that the confidential source was a former Boeing senior structural 
analyst and chief engineer who worked on the 787 team.”86  Further, 
“[p]laintiffs led the court to believe that the confidential source had 
direct ‘access to’ and ‘firsthand knowledge [about]’” the facts at issue in 
that case.87  The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, 
and the court “summarily denied” the motion, based in part on its belief 
that the confidential witness had personal knowledge of the fact 
attributed to him in the complaint.88 
The defendants’ counsel later deposed the confidential witness, who 
“consistently denied that he was the source of the information attributed 
 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at *3. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at *4. 
85. No. 09 C 7143, 2011 WL 824604 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2011) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
711 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2013). 
86. Id. at *3. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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to him in the second amended complaint”—and in fact denied he was 
ever employed by Boeing.89  Armed with this testimony, the defendants 
filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion to 
dismiss, which the court granted.90  Upon reconsideration, the court 
dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, explaining: 
The second amended complaint would have been dismissed, possibly 
with prejudice, as insufficient under the PSLRA [if not for the 
confidential witness statement].  It matters not whether, as plaintiffs 
argue, [the confidential witness] told their investigators the truth, but 
he is lying now for ulterior motives.  The reality is that the 
informational basis for [the allegations attributed to him are] at best 
unreliable and at worst fraudulent . . . .91 
As it turned out, the plaintiffs’ counsel never even met with the 
confidential witness before “adding the confidential source allegations 
to the second amended complaint, and counsel apparently never verified 
the hearsay reports of their investigators concerning [the confidential 
witness’s] position at Boeing or the basis of his purported personal 
knowledge.”92  The court noted that the “unseemly conflict between 
plaintiffs’ confidential source and plaintiffs’ investigators could have 
been avoided by reasonable inquiry on the part of plaintiffs’ counsel 
before filing the second amended complaint.”93 
Here, counsels’ failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine 
whether confidential witness sources were credible before using their 
statements in the complaints cost the plaintiffs their case.94  If counsel 
had determined early on that the confidential sources were questionable, 
they could have used other evidence, or perhaps tried to find another 
confidential witness, to sufficiently allege the plaintiffs’ fraud claims.  
If no such evidence existed, then plaintiffs’ counsel should not have 
filed the complaint. 
As Judge Rakoff recognized in City of Pontiac, the PSLRA was 
intended to discourage plaintiffs from filing frivolous securities fraud 
suits—not to encourage them to engage in unethical or unprofessional 
behavior in an attempt to piece together a securities fraud claim.  
Counsel must remember that credibility plays a large role in a court’s 
 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at *2. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at *4. 
94. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice.  The appellate 
court vacated in part and remanded the case, however, “for consideration, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-4(c)(1), (2), of whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiffs’ lawyers and if so in 
what amount.”  City of Livonia Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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decisions throughout the course of litigation, and to lose or put in 
question the credibility of the plaintiff, counsel, or the lawsuit during 
the pleading stage could have dire repercussions, even if the complaint 
survives. 
CONCLUSION 
The PSLRA must raise the bar for securities fraud plaintiffs if it is to 
achieve its goals of preventing frivolous or meritless securities fraud 
claims.  However, if plaintiffs take the pre-filing investigation period 
seriously and gather facts that enable them to adequately plead their 
securities fraud claims, those claims should be able to survive a motion 
to dismiss.  Moreover, if plaintiffs fail to clear the PSLRA’s hurdles 
with their first complaint, they almost always will be permitted to file an 
amended complaint—and if they cannot meet the PSLRA’s standards 
by that point, then perhaps they do not have a viable claim.  Pleading an 
adequate securities fraud claim can be done and it can be done with a 
reasonable amount of effort.  It is the plaintiffs’ responsibility to do the 
work necessary to uncover the facts supporting any allegations of 
fraud—and to do it ethically—before filing a lawsuit. 
 
